Dominant Group Backlash? Majority Responses to Minority Participation in State Security Institutions

Matthew Nanes
Saint Louis University[*]

July 17, 2019

Abstract

In divided societies prone to violence, how do citizens from the dominant group react to the inclusion of minorities in the police? I argue that participating in the police credibly signals that the included group does not intend to rebel. Rebels justify violence by claiming to be unfairly marginalized. Visible participation in the police undermines this narrative, making rebels who continue fighting less likely to receive external support. I explore citizens' responses to police power sharing using micro-level data from Israel, a divided society in which any settlement will require the Jewish majority population's support. Using a nationally-representative survey alongside original data on police officer demographics, I find that Jewish respondents exposed to more Arab police are less likely to believe that Arabs seek to destroy Israel and more willing to make concessions towards peace. Consistent with the proposed mechanism, I find that among all peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011, police power sharing is associated with less external funding to rebels and more foreign aid to governments. These changes in external support empower the state and undermine rebels, making participation in the security forces a credible signal that the participating group does not plan to renew hostilities.

Power sharing in security forces plays a central role in post-conflict settlements. Of the 196 peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011, 39.8% include provisions for police power sharing, including 17.35% which explicitly address the composition of the police (Ansorg et al. 2016). These agreements create structures for recruitment and hiring which ensure representation for marginalized groups. For example, Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreements increased recruitment of Catholic police officers, pushing the proportion of Catholic

1

officers from less than 10% in the early 1990s to more than 30% less than two decades later (Bayley 2008; Byrne and Monaghan 2008). Post-conflict accords in Burundi (Samii 2013), Afghanistan, and dozens of other states (Enloe 1980; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003) similarly call to incorporate former combatants into the military.

Security forces power sharing, or the broad inclusion of former rebels in the state's armed institutions, appeals to rebels because it bolsters their capacity for self defense by providing access to weapons, equipment, and sensitive information (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Mattes and Savun 2009; Nanes 2019*b*). However, convincing the pro-government side to accept security forces power sharing would seem problematic. The same mechanisms which assuage rebels' concerns about their future safety also increase their capacity to rebel, raising fears that they may use their new-found power to re-initiate fighting after the government makes concessions. During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Protestant leaders opposed recruitment of Catholic police officers over fears that weapons would find their way to the IRA (Potter 2001). Civilians are particularly-likely to oppose police power sharing, as officers with whom they interact regularly and on whom they depend for services have significant opportunities to harm them. Negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accords faced opposition from Israelis worried about arming a new Palestinian police force (Lia 2006). Pro-government citizens might attempt to spoil any agreement which places them in such a vulnerable position.

Yet, I argue that participation in the security forces allows former rebels to credibly signal that they do not intend to use unprovoked offensive violence. Visible participation in the security forces undermines rebels' claims of marginalization and vulnerability which they use to justify anti-state violence. In doing so, it undercuts their ability to convince external actors to support their cause. Given the importance to rebels of support from sympathetic foreign actors (Sawyer et al. 2017) and the domestic population (Berman et al. 2011), only groups which are genuinely willing to halt fighting should agree to participate in the security forces. Recognizing these implications, pro-regime civilians who observe participation in the

security forces should be less concerned that the group intends to rebel.

Security forces power sharing should be especially salient to citizens in "divided societies" where conflict occurs along identity lines as the relevant cleavage tends to be observable, for example via skin color, facial features, or accent. Citizens who observe rank-and-file police officers from the former rebels' identity group learn about the group's participation and form expectations accordingly.

I test this argument using individual-level and cross-national data. First, I examine the responses of civilians from the politically-dominant group to minority participation in the police. I draw on data from the long-running conflict in Israel between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority, a setting in which opposition from Jewish citizens has hampered the peace process on several occasions. I use yearly data on the religious identity of officers at every police station in Israel from 2008 to 2014 to measure local variation in exposure to Arab police officers. I match this officer data with survey responses from Israel's National Election Study in 2009, 2013, and 2015. I find that even after controlling for individual and community-level determinants of political attitudes, Jewish Israelis exposed to Arab police officers are less likely to fear that Arabs seek to destroy the state of Israel and more willing to make concessions in the peace process. I then test the argument that groups which rebel despite inclusion in the police receive less external support. Using data on every peace agreement signed between 1975 and 2011, I show that police power sharing is associated with increased foreign aid for governments and decreased external funding for rebels.

These findings contribute to our understanding of potential roadblocks to peace agreements. For instance, research on the security dilemma (Posen 1993) focuses mainly on the powerful side's difficulty credibly committing to the future safety of the weaker side (Fearon 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Mattes and Savun 2009; Matanock 2017). Yet, solutions which raise the weaker side's capacity for violence create a new problem wherein the newly-empowered group must commit not to use its increasing capabilities to renew hostilities. I distinguish between capacity for offensive and defensive violence; participation in the secu-

rity forces increases a group's *defensive* capabilities by arming and equipping them (Nanes 2019b), but undercuts its *offensive* capabilities by making supporters less tolerant of unprovoked violence. Institutions which bolster each side's defensive capabilities while penalizing unprovoked violence solve both sides of the security dilemma. This article also notes ordinary citizens' importance in peace processes. Governments, especially democracies, depend on domestic support to accomplish policy goals. It is unlikely that the Israeli government could implement a peace agreement which most citizens oppose. Whereas many existing studies view the government and pro-government civilians as a unified actor, I provide explicit treatment of citizens' preferences in peace negotiations.

Power Sharing in Peace Agreements

Committing all parties to stick to a negotiated agreement is challenging (Walter 1997; Fortna 2004). If any party might improve its situation by re-initiating hostilities in the future, it struggles to commit not to renege on an agreement once the opposing party dismantles its defenses. In turn, the opposing party has an incentive to renege on the agreement preemptively, leading to the breakdown of peace (Posen 1993; Fearon 1995, 1998; Powell 2006). Peace agreements attempt to solve this commitment problem by creating credible guarantees of future safety for all parties (Walter 2002; Mattes and Savun 2009).

One common method is to include former rebels or their supporters in the state's police and military (Enloe 1980; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Blair et al. 2016; Ansorg et al. 2016). The agreement which ended Burundi's decade-long civil war in 2004 called for specific ratios of soldiers across previously-warring groups and the ethnic groups they purported to represent (Samii 2013), while the 1996 Mindanao Final Agreement required that the Philippine National Police make space for 1,500 former rebels.[1]

By increasing the weaker group's defensive capabilities, military and police power sharing address rebels' concerns that the state will repress them (Nanes 2019b). However,

---

[1]Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. `https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/police-reform-mindanao-final-agreement`

they create a new problem for the state and its supporters: giving potential rebels access to weapons, equipment, and sensitive information increase their capacity for violence. The state and its supporters might reasonably worry that former rebels will use their new-found tools to attack. Knowing this risk, citizens who fear future violence might oppose such concessions in the first place, spoiling negotiations and leading to renewed hostilities. Considering citizens' apparent incentives to oppose security forces power sharing, why is it so common in peace agreements?

Credibly Committing Not to Rebel

I argue that while inclusion in the security forces increases a group's defensive capabilities, it undermines its ability to use unprovoked violence. Existing research establishes that insurgent groups depend on the domestic population to enlist in their fighting forces, donate money and supplies, and withhold information about rebels' activities from the state (Department of the Army 2006; Berman et al. 2011; Parkinson 2013). Rebels also depend on foreign donors to provide funding and assistance (Salehyan et al. 2011; San-Akca 2016; Sawyer et al. 2017), and to withhold such assistance from their enemies (Berman and Lake 2019; Nanes 2019a). While rebels' reliance on foreign actors is well-established, existing research only scratches the surface of its implications for strategic behavior.

Many foreign donors view security forces power sharing as an important part of the peace process and therefore reward governments which make this concession. Often, the reward involves capacity-building which enhances the government's ability to defend against future attacks. For example, thanks to the success of the "Sons of Iraq" program which integrated former Sunni militiamen into Iraq's security forces in 2007, the US military sought broader inclusion of Sunnis in the Iraqi military. US General David Petraeus offered funding and logistical support to incentivize the Shia-dominated government to integrate more Sunnis into the security forces (Robinson 2009), measures which increased the Iraqis' ability to combat future violence.

Furthermore, rebels' abilities to solicit external support depends on portraying themselves as unfairly marginalized and facing grave threats to their well-being. They justify violence by arguing that their opponent provides them with no other means of competing for influence, representation, or survival. Maurice Tugwell (1981, 15) writes of successful insurgencies in the 1970s in Vietnam and Northern Ireland, "The revolutionary basked in the warmth of public admiration, while the police and the military tended to be portrayed as misguided or willful oppressors...The line between righteous protest and insurrectionary violence was often hard to define and, when in doubt, media and public sympathy generally reached out to the apparent underdog."

The challenge for aspiring rebels is that visible participation in the institutions which most embody state power, the military and the police, undermines their underdog status. A group cannot reasonably suggest that the political status quo threatens its survival when its members have access to weapons and are privy to the state's security strategies. Thus, while inclusion in the police increases a group's *defensive* capabilities by providing access to weapons, equipment, and information, *offensive* use those tools should lead to a loss of support from international actors who view it as unjustified.

The strength of this signal, and therefore the responses of both the domestic population and foreign actors, hinges on the visibility of the group's participation. Foreign governments and international organizations are privy to whether an agreement calls for security forces power sharing, and also observe implementation through media reports and monitoring missions. Ordinary citizens may be aware of agreements, but they receive a stronger signal of participation by observing police officers directly (Mazerolle et al. 2013; Saunders et al. 2013). The police rank-and-file is especially visible as officers enforce traffic laws, investigate crimes, and respond to calls for service (Nanes 2019c; Haim et al. 2019). Furthermore, officers' visibility prevents the state from strategically lying about inclusion, as citizens and reporters can easily observe whether the makeup of these institutions has changed.

For citizens to learn about police power sharing, they must not only observe officers but also be able to identify them as pro-rebel or pro-regime. For this reason, police power sharing should have the greatest effect on citizens' expectations in divided societies. Where group identity is politically salient, it tends to have an observable component. Skin tone, facial structure, and language clearly demarcate members of different ethnic or racial groups. Religious groups frequently adopt observable differences in names (worn on police officers' name tags), clothing, or hair styles. While the exact demarcation differs from one group to another, it is rare for group identity to be salient without the ability to attribute group membership with reasonable accuracy. Thus, police power sharing is most relevant in conflicts fought along identity lines.

These arguments lead to several testable hypotheses. Regarding citizens' reactions:

H1: Members of the dominant group will be less expectant that a minority group intends to rebel when they are exposed to minority police officers.

H2: Members of the dominant group will be more willing to make concessions in peace negotiations which leave them vulnerable to attack when they observe minority police officers.

Regarding the costs to rebels of using violence while participating in the security forces, I analyze foreign funding to governments and rebels, as monetary transfers are relatively easy to measure (making measurement reliable) and highly fungible (making them especially valuable to recipients):

H3: Governments party to peace agreements which include security forces power sharing will receive more foreign aid compared to governments party to agreements which do *not* include security forces power sharing.

H4: Rebel groups which fight despite inclusion in the police or military will receive less external funding than rebel groups that are not included in the police or military.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Analyzing peace agreements effects' is challenging due to selection bias: policymakers are unlikely to craft agreements they do not expect to work. Peacebuilders might only include security forces power sharing in agreements in which it is most likely to succeed, for example where dominant group civilians are unconcerned about the loyalties of outgroup police officers (Krebs and Licklider 2016). To avoid this problem, I analyze individual responses to sub-national variation in outgroup police officers in the context of a single conflict. For decades, Israel has been plagued by violence between the Jewish-dominated state and a subset of the non-Jewish minority which seeks to establish a Palestinian state on land Israel controls. About $1/5^{th}$ of Israel's 8.5 million residents are non-Jews, mainly ethnic Arabs.[2] An additional 4.5 million non-citizen Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank are outside this article's scope, as they live under military or non-Israeli rule.

Since the 1980s, the primary security threat to Israeli civilians has come from irregular violence by non-state actors like the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Effective border security meant that most attackers resided inside Israeli-controlled territory. The PLO renounced the use of violence in 1993, but organizations like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah continue to direct violence against Israeli civilians. Since independence in 1948, terrorism has killed more than 3,700 individuals and injured more than 14,700.[3]

While only a tiny proportion of Arab-Israelis and Palestinians participate in terrorism, many Jewish Israelis fear that the Arab population holds a latent desire to rebel. Nearly half of Jewish respondents to the National Election Study in 2009, 2013, and 2015 say that Arabs' "final goal" is to "conquer the country and destroy a significant part of its Jewish population." A Jewish Israeli admitted to me that when he rides the public bus between

---

[2]While Judaism is a religion and Arab is an ethnicity, their near-mutual exclusivity in Israel leads to colloquial references to conflict between "Jews and Arabs." Furthermore, while identity in Israel is complex and multi-dimensional, individuals on all sides commonly reduce cleavages to "Jews versus Arabs" or "Jews versus Palestinians," particularly on issues of violence and terrorism.

[3]Johnston, Wm. Robert (2018), "Summary of Terrorist Attacks in Israel." 24 March. www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terrisraelsum.html

his job in Tel Aviv and his home in a West Bank settlement, he fears that each Arab who boards may be a terrorist. During periods of increased political tension, he prefers that his wife avoid the bus altogether.[4] Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman went so far as to refer to Arab members of parliament as a "fifth column...working to destroy the State of Israel from within."[5] Barak Medina, a law professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, sums up the logic by which Jewish Israelis view Arabs collectively as a threat: "Twenty percent of the population is affiliated with an ethnicity, which is formally an enemy. They [Arabs] feel the very establishment of the state of Israel was a *nakba*, a disaster. So there is inherent tension."[6] These attitudes, justified or not, inhibit peace negotiations by creating a trust deficit which makes Israelis less willing to make concessions. Like all democratic leaders, Israeli politicians rely on popular support to implement major policy changes. The mere expectation by Jews that Arabs seek to violently undermine the status quo is sufficient to prevent peace if it makes them unwilling to make concessions.

Policing in Israel

The Israel Police serve the country as a single jurisdiction. The force of about 28,000 patrol officers includes 13% non-Jews.[7] In 2014, 71 out of 74 police stations reported having at least one non-Jewish officer, but numbers vary substantially both across stations and over time. Non-Jewish officers are not distributed randomly; most serve in areas with a larger proportion of Arab civilians like Nazareth, Haifa, Akko, and the "Triangle" area. The police distribute officers based on where manpower is needed most, along with any local demand for special skills an officer might have. They tend to assign officers close to, but not in, their hometowns. Assigning them close to home saves on commuting costs (and is generally

---

[4]Author interview, July 2014

[5]"Liberman Attacks: 'There are Terrorist Representatives in the Knesset.'" *Israel National News* 4 August 2018, https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/244119

[6]Chabin, Michelle (2016), "Arab in Israeli parliament sparks outcry for defending Palestinian attacks." *USA Today* 19 February, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/02/19/arab-israel-knesset-controversy-palestinian-attacks-loyalty/80504122/

[7]All figures on officer demographics are based on data released to the author by the Israel Police following a freedom of information request.

favored by the officers themselves), while avoiding assigning officers within their hometown is thought to reduce corruption or capture by the local community.[8] Within this general trend, however, there is variation in the extent of the match between police and civilian demographics.

Figure 1: Variation in Office Demographics

Figure 1 shows the percent change in the proportion of Jewish officers in each of Israel's 16 subdistricts for each year during which data is available. It shows clear variation both across locations and over time. Given the relatively short time period, the variance in officer demographics is considerably higher than we would expect to see in the civilian population. Jerusalem's 5.9 percentage point increase in Jewish officers from 2008 to 2009 and Tzfat's 3.5 percentage point decrease from 2011 to 2012 dwarf changes in the general

---

[8]Author interview with a high-ranking Israel Police Officer formerly in charge of officer assignment, July 2014

population during the same period.

In order for officer demographics to affect citizens' political attitudes, citizens must accurately perceive the identities of the officers they encounter. Rank-and-file police officers are omnipresent in modern societies, providing citizens with regular opportunities to observe their appearance and behavior, forming perceptions through personal experiences, media reports, and conversations with other citizens (Mazerolle et al. 2013; Saunders et al. 2013). A survey by Nanes (2019c) finds that 34% of respondents "interact[ed] directly with a uniformed police officer" in the last year (30.5% of Jews, 38.2% of non-Jews).

Globally, politically-relevant group identities tend to be observable. In this regard, the cleavage between Jewish and non-Jewish officers presents a hard case for analysis, as the observable differences between the groups are noisy. All Arab officers speak Hebrew, though they may do so with an accent. Skin color and facial structure are correlated with religion, but imperfectly so.[9]. Names, displayed on name tags, send a clear signal provided a citizen is close enough to read them. Thus, in any given observation of a police officer, a citizen may or may not be able to discern his identify with certainty. However, across hundreds of observations each year, citizens receive enough cues to form perceptions of the demographics of the police officers in their area as a group. Consistent with this argument, Nanes (2019c) finds a strong correlation between actual and perceived police demographics in Israel.

Focus group participants in Israel broadly agreed that they can identify police officers' identities. Jewish citizens from Haifa and Tel Aviv, as well as Arab citizens from Jaffa, cited an officer's accent, name (displayed on his name tag), and facial features as the primary sources of information. Perceptions of how included Arabs are in the police varied by location. Jewish participants in Haifa, in the north of Israel where most Arab officers work, believed there are "a lot" of Arab officers, while those in Tel Aviv accurately perceived that there are very few Arab officers where they live.[10] While face-to-face interactions and personal

---

[9]Sephardic Jews, an ethnic minority making up about half of Israel's Jewish population, trace their ancestry to the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia

[10]FGJ1, Tel Aviv, February 2019; FGJ3, Haifa, March 2019

observations are especially influential, interviewees also referenced social media, radio, TV, print news, and conversations with family and friends as sources which impact their view of the police. Of these, they consider conversations with friends as the most reliable, and perceive that conventional media only reports negative stories when they are "spicy."[11]

Jewish interviewees expressed cautiously-positive attitudes about Arabs joining the police. One individual said they worry about Arabs' loyalties in the event of a conflict. "There is a fear...that their loyalty will not last long, and that if we give them weapon it might turn out against us some day."[12] However, he says that these concerns extend only to some hypothetical "day of judgement," and has no objections to Arab participation in the police on a day to day basis. "I think that having the Arab minority taking a part in the society at large is a good thing."[13] The consensus of cautious support was summed up by one interviewee in Haifa: "Recruit them. It is good. But do a careful screening."[14]

Analysis

I test the the argument that observing Arab police makes Jewish citizens more trusting of Arabs, and therefore more willing to make concessions in the peace process, using two sources of data. The independent variable, exposure to outgroup police officers, comes from data on the religious identity of every police officer at each station in the country measured yearly from 2008 to 2014. For each station-year, I create an observation with the coordinates of the station and the number of non-Jewish police officers assigned to that station.[15] I then use GIS analysis to create a continuous surface of Non-Jewish police officer presence everywhere in Israel. The measure assumes that the probability of encountering an officer decreases as distance from that officer's station increases, and that a civilian is more likely

---

[11]FGJ1, Tel Aviv, February 2019

[12]FGJ3, Haifa, March 2019

[13]FGJ3, Haifa, March 2019

[14]FGJ3, Haifa, March 2019

[15]This figure includes Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Circassians. Although Israeli Jews tend not to consider Druze to be a political threat in the same way as other Arabs, they are unlikely to be able to distinguish Druze officers – who are also ethnic Arabs – from Muslims and Christians during casual interactions.

to encounter officers from a closer station than from a farther station. It also assumes that in both distance and direction, the manner in which police officers travel away from their assigned stations is exogenous to officers' religious identities. I provide more details about this method in Appendix A. While exposure to officers depends on a complex function of citizens' travel patterns and the police's patrols, I propose that this measure provides a reasonable and unbiased estimate of citizens' relative exposure across space and time.

Figure 2: Interpolated Number of Non-Jewish Officers, 2012

Non-Jewish Officers

- ○ 0 - 5
- ○ 6 - 13
- ○ 14 - 26
- ● 27 - 49
- ● 50 - 100

Ordinary kriging using 2012
station-level police data

Figure 2 shows interpolated data on the number of non-Jewish (Arab) officers using data from 2012. Darker colors indicate a higher number of non-Jewish police officers in a location. The surface shows the interpolated values, while the points indicate the underlying data. Tel Aviv, the central coast, and the southern desert have lower numbers of non-Jewish officers while the Jerusalem area and the north have higher numbers of non-Jewish officers.

These estimates conform to previously-reported trends (Saunders et al. 2013; Weitzer and Hasisi 2008) and are generally consistent with the criteria for distribution described above.

The dependent variables come from Israel's National Election Study, a nationally-representative survey conducted by several Israeli universities immediately preceding each parliamentary election. I use responses from the 82.2% of subjects who identify as Jewish. I link survey data from 2009, 2013, and 2015 with police officer demographic data from the preceding year. The survey asks several questions which are relevant to Jews' trust in Arabs and attitudes towards the peace process:

- *H1 Violent Rebellion* "In your opinion, what is the Arabs' final goal?" (*Arab Goals*) Response options: "Get back some territories from the Six Day War," "Get back all territories from the Six Day War," "Conquer the State of Israel," "Conquer the country and destroy a significant part of its Jewish population."

- *H2 Concessions* "In a permanent agreement, should Israel return Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem?" (*Return Jerusalem*) Response Options: "Definitely should occupy," "Should occupy," "Should return," "Definitely should return."

- *H2 Concessions* "What is your view on the evacuation of Jewish settlements from Judea and Samaria in a final status agreement? (*Evac Settlements*) Response Options: "No evacuation under any circumstances," "Willing to evacuate small isolated settlements," "Willing to evacuate all settlements." [16]

The survey identifies respondents by locality, an official administrative unit akin to a neighborhood within large cities or a small town in less densely-populated areas. I use the above measure of police demographics to identify the relatively likelihood of exposure to Arab police officers for each respondent in his or her locality in the previous calendar year.

---

[16] 2009 and 2013 surveys only.

Main Results

I use ordered logistic regression to test the relationship between exposure to Arab police officers and perceptions of Arabs' goals and willingness to make concessions.[17] Models control for respondents' partisanship on a 7 point left-right scale, economic satisfaction, gender, religiosity, education, and the language in which the interview was conducted (Hebrew or Russian). Summary statistics appear in the appendix.

An alternative argument suggests that exposure to outgroup members affects taste-based preferences for the group (Allport 1954), and exposure to Arab police is simply a proxy for exposure to Arabs. While this argument seems unlikely in the context of a few thousand officers from a population of several million, I also control for the proportion of the civilian population in the respondent's subdistrict who are non-Jewish. Models report subdistrict-year clustered standard errors.

Model two adds a squared term on Arab police presence to test for a threshold effect. When an individual observes only a small number of Arab officers he may perceive them as defectors, and not interpret the participation of Arab officers as a signal of the Arab community's intentions until there are a larger number of Arab officers. In such a case we should observe a curvilinear relationship, with exposure to Arab officers having little effect at low levels and a larger effect at high levels.

Model three includes an interaction between the number of Arab police officers and the proportion of Arab civilians to test whether Arab police presence only shifts the attitudes of Jewish civilians who are not already exposed to Arabs, also a sign of the contact mechanism (Allport 1954). Finally, the fourth and most restrictive model adds dummies for each subdistrict, effectively testing whether change over time in the presence of Arab officers within a location affects the attitudes of Jews in that location.

Selection bias caused by either citizens' decisions on where to live, officer assignments, or both could threaten causal inference. For example, citizens who are more sympathetic to

---

[17]OLS shows nearly identical trends, though with larger standard errors in some cases.

the peace process might systematically prefer to live in areas with more non-Jewish police officers. Such behavior seems implausible, as moving is expensive (or impossible) for most people and has far ranging impacts. A second and more likely possibility is that the police systematically assign non-Jewish officers to areas in which citizens are more sympathetic to the peace process. An interview with a high-ranking Israeli police officer in charge of officer training and assignment suggests that this criteria is not a primary determinant of officers' assignments.[18] As discussed above, the officer's home town is the most important factor in assignments. The police also try to distribute minority officers so that they serve with at least one experienced Jewish officer to ensure that Jewish citizens take the police's authority seriously. While these criteria mean that officer assignment is certainly non-random with regard to officer identity, it is uncorrelated with Jewish citizens' baseline attitudes towards the peace process.

Still, I attempt to account for possible selection bias in the regression models. The controls, especially *Left Wing* and *Religiosity*, likely capture much of citizens' predisposition towards the peace process. In the models which include subdistrict dummies, selection bias could only occur if it were time-variant. A location's average sympathy towards the peace process would have to change over time within the study period *and* the police would have to recognize this change and respond by assigning more non-Jewish officers to the area. While I cannot rule this possibility out entirely, interviews with both civilians and police leadership provide no indication that the police assign officers this way.

Table 1 shows that consistent with Hypothesis 1, Jewish Israeli citizens exposed to more Arab police officers are less likely to say that Arabs intend to conquer all of Israel and destroy its Jewish population. All four model specifications show a negative, albeit somewhat noisy, relationship between the estimated number of Arab police officers in the respondent's area and the extent to which he or she expects Arabs to try to violently reclaim territory from the Jewish state. The squared term in Model 2 is not significant, providing no

---

[18]Author interview. 24 July 2014.

Table 1: Expectations of Violent Rebellion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Numb. Arab Police	-0.0140*	-0.0478**	-0.0184*	-0.0281*
	(0.00748)	(0.0212)	(0.0103)	(0.0158)
Numb. Arab Police sqr		0.000863		
		(0.000550)		
Numb. Arab Police × Prop. Arab Civilians			0.0170	0.0673
			(0.0246)	(0.0605)
Prop. Arab Civilians	0.525	0.549	0.202	-16.58**
	(0.393)	(0.391)	(0.676)	(7.743)
Left Wing	-0.448***	-0.449***	-0.449***	-0.454***
	(0.0336)	(0.0337)	(0.0335)	(0.0340)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.0744	-0.0760	-0.0760	-0.0764
	(0.0595)	(0.0602)	(0.0599)	(0.0600)
Male	0.0374	0.0296	0.0369	0.0275
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.106)
Religiosity	0.302***	0.306***	0.303***	0.288***
	(0.0625)	(0.0626)	(0.0629)	(0.0637)
Education	-0.0211	-0.0196	-0.0210	-0.0205
	(0.0145)	(0.0146)	(0.0145)	(0.0145)
Subdist. Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1344	1344	1344	1344

Ordered Logistic Regression. Subdist-Year clustered SE. Language dummies.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

evidence of a threshold effect or other source of non-linearity. The interaction between the number of Arab officers and the proportion of Arab civilians is also insignificant, indicating no evidence for the "contact hypothesis" alternative argument. It is worth noting, however, that the effect of exposure to Arab officers on expectations of rebellion is significant only in areas with fewer Arab civilians, consistent with the idea that these respondents' perceptions of Arabs are more malleable given their less frequent contact with Arab citizens. Controls have the expected effects. Left-wing respondents are less likely to say that Arabs intend to destroy Israel's Jewish population, and respondents who are more religiously observant are more likely to expect such a goal.

Tables 2 and 3 show support for Hypothesis 2, that Jews exposed to Arab police officers are more willing to make concessions in the peace process. In Table 2, estimated exposure to Arab officers is positively and significantly associated with willingness to return Jerusalem in a peace settlement in three of the four models. While the squared term is marginally significant in Model 2, plotting predicted probabilities from Model 2 shows no substantively-meaningful nonlinearity (see Figure 4 in the Appendix). There are diminishing returns to increasing Arab police, but within the bounds of realistic levels of Arab officers the effect is relatively stable. Finally, within a given location, increases over time in the number of Arab officers are associated with increased willingness to return Jerusalem in a peace agreement.

Table 3 provides similarly strong evidence that Jews exposed to Arab police officers are more willing to evacuate Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Of note, however, the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term in Model 4 indicates that among Jewish respondents living in areas with large Arab populations, increases over time in Arab police officers are associated with a *decreased* willingness to give up territory in the West Bank. This apparent backlash may result from the fact that many Jewish Israelis living in subdistricts with large Arab populations live in West Bank settlements. Of the 34 respondents living in the West Bank, 24 said there should be "no evacuation under any

Table 2: Willing to Return Jerusalem

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Numb. Arab Police	0.0117**	0.0599**	0.0159	0.0797***
	(0.00560)	(0.0285)	(0.0101)	(0.0234)
Numb. Arab Police sqr		-0.00123*		
		(0.000726)		
Numb. Arab Police × Prop. Arab Civilians			-0.0162	-0.170
			(0.0244)	(0.117)
Prop. Arab Civilians	-0.260	-0.297	0.0523	7.711
	(0.325)	(0.304)	(0.606)	(4.909)
Left Wing	0.457***	0.457***	0.458***	0.464***
	(0.0546)	(0.0544)	(0.0546)	(0.0556)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.0819	-0.0806	-0.0806	-0.0870
	(0.0735)	(0.0737)	(0.0737)	(0.0756)
Male	0.0445	0.0453	0.0429	0.0584
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.116)
Religiosity	-0.543***	-0.550***	-0.544***	-0.527***
	(0.0566)	(0.0578)	(0.0565)	(0.0549)
Education	0.0511***	0.0493***	0.0511***	0.0497***
	(0.0163)	(0.0159)	(0.0163)	(0.0161)
Subdist. Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1285	1285	1285	1285

Ordered Logistic Regression. Subdist-Year clustered SE. Language dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

circumstances," far and away the most skewed distribution of responses to any question by any sub-population in this analysis. Aside from this nuance, however, exposure to Arab police is positively correlated with willingness to make concessions in the form of evacuating settlements.

Table 3: Willing to Evacuate Settlements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Numb. Arab Police	0.0253***	0.0822***	0.0276***	0.0261
	(0.00476)	(0.0280)	(0.00740)	(0.0177)
Numb. Arab Police sqr		-0.00145**		
		(0.000681)		
Numb. Arab Police × Prop. Arab Civilians			-0.00957	-0.168***
			(0.0227)	(0.0624)
Prop. Arab Civilians	-1.064***	-1.233***	-0.876	-26.10***
	(0.313)	(0.278)	(0.681)	(7.818)
Left Wing	0.587***	0.586***	0.587***	0.590***
	(0.0755)	(0.0760)	(0.0755)	(0.0768)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.0278	-0.0231	-0.0270	-0.0249
	(0.0942)	(0.0939)	(0.0946)	(0.0945)
Male	0.417***	0.419***	0.417***	0.422***
	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.158)
Religiosity	-0.721***	-0.729***	-0.722***	-0.739***
	(0.0814)	(0.0822)	(0.0819)	(0.0877)
Education	0.0417	0.0398	0.0417	0.0410
	(0.0287)	(0.0289)	(0.0287)	(0.0297)
Subdist. Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	817	817	817	817

Ordered Logistic Regression. Subdist-Year clustered SE. Language dummies.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Mechanism: Foreign Funding

I argue that the positive responses of Jewish Israelis towards Arab participation in the police occurs because citizens from the dominant group anticipate that potential rebels will not join the police if they intend to attack in the future, as doing so incurs penalties from foreign actors. I failed to find evidence of one alternative argument, that increased contact with outgroups increases taste-based preferences for that outgroup (Allport 1954). A second alternative explanation is that including a group in the police coopts its members. If large numbers of fighting-age men and women are busy serving in the police, they are less available for recruitment into rebel forces. Thus, citizens feel more comfortable when they observe outgroup police officers because they believe the state has coopted those individuals. This argument also seems unlikely in Israel given that there are only a few thousand Arab police officers from an Arab population rapidly approaching two million. Combined with a heavy reliance on terrorist tactics which require minimal manpower, there is no reason to think that police recruitment seriously degrades Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad's manpower.

This section explicitly tests the proposed mechanism that continuing to fight is costly to groups which are included in the police because security forces power sharing increases aid to the government and decreases funding to rebels. I focus on foreign funding because it is relatively easy to measure compared to other forms of support, and because its fungibility makes it especially valuable to recipients (Sawyer et al. 2017). I first test whether peace agreements which include police power sharing lead to an increase in foreign aid to government signatories compared to peace agreements which include no such provisions. The dependent variable is foreign development aid commitments to the signatory government in the year following the agreement, collected by the World Bank.

The independent variable, police power sharing, comes from the "Police Reform in Peace Agreements" dataset (Ansorg et al. 2016). The universe of cases is country-years in which a government signed a peace agreement related to a civil conflict between 1975 and

2011.[19] Of the 139 relevant country-years encompassing 45 unique countries, 66 country-years (47.48%) included provisions for police power sharing, for example specifying quotas for certain groups. The variable is coded "1" if the agreement includes such provisions, otherwise 0. [20] I argue that potential foreign donors are aware of these provisions, or could learn of them if they care to do so, as the text of the agreements is freely available. For the same reason, the content of the agreement is an appropriate measure because it provides foreign donors a low-cost, if imperfect, source of information about a group's participation.

Limiting the dataset to countries which signed a peace agreement holds constant the characteristic of transitioning from conflict to post-conflict across all cases. I control for likely determinants of foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000), including aid commitments in the year prior to the peace agreement, level of democracy (Freedom House score), infant mortality, the proportion of the recipient's GDP from resource rents, and population size.[21] Since my analysis pools aid from all sources by recipient, I do not consider donor characteristics.

In Table 4, the first model shows a positive and significant correlation between the inclusion of police power sharing and the amount of foreign aid donors commit to a signatory government in the year following an agreement. Model 2 adds country random effects; the estimated effect becomes larger and more precise. Model 3 substitutes police power sharing with integration via the state's other armed institution, the military, coded as "1" if the agreement includes provisions to include former rebels in the military. 41.73% of included country-years include military integration. Of the 139 country-years with data on both police and military power sharing, 34.5% have neither, 23.7% have both, 23.7% have police power sharing only, and 18.0% have military power sharing only. Like police power sharing, military integration is positively and significantly correlated with aid commitments. In Appendix D, I also find a positive and significant relationship between military power sharing and foreign

---

[19]The time scope of my analysis is determined by period covered by the Peace Agreements dataset.

[20]Thirty country-years had more than one peace agreement. Of these, police power sharing was the same across all country-year agreements 26 times. For the remaining four cases, I coded police power sharing as 1 if it was included in *any* of the agreements.

[21]All controls aside from Freedom House come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

Table 4: Foreign Aid Commitments

	(1) Aid	(2) Aid	(3) Aid	(4) log(Aid)	(5) log(Change)
Police PS	0.369** (0.157)	0.465*** (0.136)		0.358* (0.180)	0.428* (0.252)
Military Int.			0.363** (0.143)		
Prior Yr Aid	66.11 (67.65)	84.97*** (32.00)	89.83*** (33.15)		
Prior Yr Aid (log)				0.557*** (0.201)	
Freedom House	-0.0455 (0.0461)	-0.00644 (0.0766)	-0.0917 (0.0736)	0.103 (0.109)	0.260** (0.115)
Infant Mortality	-0.00132 (0.00361)	-0.00118 (0.00276)	-0.00184 (0.00305)	-0.00386 (0.00387)	-0.00580 (0.00500)
Resource Rents (ln)	-0.0972** (0.0477)	-0.0207 (0.0538)	-0.0232 (0.0572)	-0.0175 (0.0598)	0.0416 (0.0745)
Population (ln)	0.626*** (0.138)	0.402*** (0.0748)	0.399*** (0.0808)	0.247 (0.172)	-0.0109 (0.0983)
Constant	-7.550*** (2.088)	-7.889*** (1.616)	-7.321*** (1.675)	-3.383 (2.094)	-0.950 (1.793)
Random Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	130	130	130	128	128
R^2				0.784	0.240

1-3 Negative binomial, 4-5 OLS. Country clustered SE. Includes year dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

aid using data from Strøm et al. (2017) on power sharing worldwide, not just countries which signed peace agreements.

To test the robustness of these findings, Model 4 uses logged aid commitments and OLS rather than raw commitments and negative binomial regression. Again, the effect of police power sharing on post-agreement aid remains positive and significant. Model 5 uses change in aid from the year before the agreement to the year after as the dependent variable; the positive and significant association with police power sharing persists.

Foreign aid increases the recipient government's capacity to resist rebels, either through force or by providing services to win citizens' hearts and minds. Beyond this direct effect, aid commitments likely signify a general level of support for the recipient government from powerful international actors. All else equal, rebels who plan to renew hostilities should prefer to do so against a state which receives less, not more, foreign aid.

What about external funding to rebel groups? If participation in the police reduces sympathy for violent rebellion, then groups which receive police power sharing but continue fighting should receive less support. Sawyer et al. (2017) code a dichotomous indicator for whether rebel groups in conflict receive support from outside actors in a given year.[22] While the dichotomous measure is somewhat crude, it allows for a global test of the theorized mechanism on all rebel groups in conflict. Rebel groups receive external funding in 17.7% of dyad-years.

The universe of cases is conflict dyad years between 1975 and 2011, using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's criteria of 25 conflict-related deaths in a year as the minimum standard for inclusion. I use this criteria due to data constraints, not because the theory requires a minimum level of violence. This restriction harms the generalizability of the findings below but bolsters their internal validity by ensuring that the cases being compared are relatively similar to one another. For each dyad which signed a peace agreement between 1975 and 2011, I determine how long the agreement remained in effect. If the initial agree-

---

[22]The coding excludes development or humanitarian aid, ensuring that it measures a distinct construct from the previous test.

ment included police power sharing, I code police power sharing as "1" for all years until the agreement breaks down. For all other dyad-years in the dataset, which either did not have a peace agreement in effect or whose agreement did not include police power sharing, I code police power sharing as "0." As above, I control for the government's level of democracy (Freedom House score), whether it is natural-resource dependent,[23], and its population size. I also control for whether the rebel group has a legal political wing and its number of troops, which may influence its need for external support. All models use logistic regression with country-clustered standard errors.

Regressions in Table 5 test the link between police power sharing and external funding for rebels. Consistent with my argument, the inclusion of police power sharing in the peace agreement is negatively and significantly associated with external funding for the rebel group compared to groups fighting and not included in the police. Replacing *Police Power Sharing*, which includes a wide range of reforms, with the subset of agreements which specifically mention the composition of the police yields a similar relationship.

An alternative possibility is that donors reward all types of power sharing, and police power sharing simply correlates with conventional arrangements like grand coalitions in the legislature or local devolution. I test effects of several other types of power sharing in Appendix D. I find no apparent relationship between aid commitments and most conventional methods of power sharing, including requirements for grand coalitions or reserved positions in the cabinet or legislature. Similarly, I find no relationship between conventional forms of power sharing and funding for rebels. Clearly there is something unique about the state's armed institutions which drives foreign actors to reward governments that agree to include former combatants in them and withhold support from rebels who continue fighting despite inclusion in them.

Overall, the positive relationship between police power sharing and foreign aid for the government signatory, and the negative relationship between police power sharing and

---

[23]From Sawyer et al. (2017); "1" if $> 1/3$ of the government's revenue comes from fuel exports

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Police PS	-1.290**	-1.362**	
	(0.657)	(0.615)	
Police Comp			-1.264**
			(0.609)
Political Wing	0.898	0.984	0.924
	(0.879)	(0.827)	(0.840)
Freedom House	-0.283	-0.162	-0.159
	(0.191)	(0.180)	(0.180)
Fuel Dependent	0.177	-0.457	-0.418
	(0.750)	(0.727)	(0.733)
Population (ln)	-0.0920	-0.299*	-0.291*
	(0.160)	(0.157)	(0.155)
Rebel Troops (log)	0.491***	0.490***	0.475***
	(0.155)	(0.142)	(0.139)
Time		0.286***	0.284***
		(0.0895)	(0.0891)
Time sqr		-0.00596***	-0.00587***
		(0.00219)	(0.00217)
Constant	-2.833	-3.777*	-3.780*
	(2.208)	(2.127)	(2.117)
Observations	1215	1215	1215

Logistic regression with country clustered SE.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

external funding for rebel groups, suggests that participating in the police increases the cost of future violence for would-be rebels. Taken alongside the earlier individual-level analysis, the results paint a consistent picture that participation in the police sends a credible signal to the pro-government side that the participating group does not intend to rebel, creating space for the dominant side to make concessions towards peace.

Conclusion

I find that Israeli Jews are more trusting of minorities' intentions and more willing to make concessions in the peace process when they are exposed to more minority police officers. I argue that this change in attitudes occurs because minority participation in the police credibly signals that the minority group does not intend to rebel, since participating in the security forces undermines their narrative of marginalization which they use to solicit support. This evidence faces two primary limitations. First, the individual-level evidence comes from a single country. While Israel's high profile in international politics makes it worthy of study, and the single-country design avoids selection bias pervasive in cross-national studies of peace agreements, additional evidence would allow us to better identify the scope and limitations of this relationship.

While access to data makes Israel a convenient setting for analysis, it is hardly unique. Any attempt to integrate a group associated with anti-state and terrorist violence into the state security forces risks concerns from citizens that these officers will use their new-found power to renew hostilities. The success of police integration as part of Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement demonstrates the plausibility of security forces power sharing. Since the 1998 agreement, Catholic participation in Northern Ireland's police has increased from about 10% to 30% of officers. This article provides insights into why Protestants in Northern Ireland felt comfortable with such a dramatic increase in Catholic officers. Other conflicts occurring along identity-group lines may similarly benefit from security forces power sharing. Fighting in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, for example, is characterized by violence and mistrust

between political, ethnic, and religious factions. Peace agreements in these countries might begin to build trust across groups by including former rebels in the security forces.

The second limitation is the reliance on attitudinal outcomes rather than behavioral ones. For example, we might like to know whether increases in minority participation in the police make dominant-group leaders more willing to commit to peace agreements, or whether agreements which include minority participation in the police lead to a more durable peace. Baring those outcomes, if minority participation in the police increases and the government does not acquiesce to a peace agreement, do voters throw the government out of office and replace it with a more dovish administration?

Despite these limitations, this article makes several contributions to the study of conflict resolution and post-conflict settlements. First, it provides an answer to the puzzle of why security forces power sharing occurs as often as it does despite the obvious danger of newly-integrated minorities turning their weapons on the state. In the context of intense or long-running conflict between groups, the readiness of dominant groups to grant their enemies capacity for violence is hardly intuitive.

Second, it addresses a critical yet understudied angle of peace agreements, the perspective of the politically-dominant group. Existing research focuses overwhelmingly on the challenge of bringing rebels to the table, satisfying their demands, and ensuring their well-being. Yet, no settlement can occur without the active participation of the dominant group. Indeed, "spoilers" from the dominant group frequently work to undermine settlements, presumably under the expectation that they are better off as the dominant group in a conflict than as a more evenly-matched group in peacetime (Stedman 1997). This article sheds light on how the dominant group might be convinced to come to the bargaining table and participate in a peace agreement.

Finally, this research hints at the complexity of commitment problems in civil conflict. The "security dilemma" (Posen 1993) that weaker groups face is well-trodden territory, and existing studies thoroughly explore ways that the dominant group can commit to the security

of weaker groups. I point out that not only do dominant groups also face a security dilemma caused by the difficulty minority groups face in committing not to use new-found power to renew hostilities, but the intensity of their problem is often a function of attempts to resolve the weaker group's security dilemma. By separating a group's capacity for force into offensive and defensive capabilities, and noting that visible participation in security forces enhances minorities' defensive capabilities while undermining its capacity for offensive violence, I uncover an underexplored dimension of institutional power sharing which may provide a path forward for institutional arrangements in conflict and post-conflict settings.

References

Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000), 'Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?', *Journal of economic growth* **5**(1), 33–63.

Allport, G. W. (1954), *The nature of prejudice.*, Addison-Wesley.

Ansorg, N., Haass, F. and Strasheim, J. (2016), 'Police reforms in peace agreements, 1975–2011: Introducing the prpa dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* **53**(4), 597–607.

Bayley, D. H. (2008), 'Post-conflict police reform: Is northern ireland a model?', *Policing* **2**(2), 233–240.

Berman, E. and Lake, D. A. (2019), *Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence Through Local Agents*, Cornell University Press.

Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N. and Felter, J. H. (2011), 'Can hearts and minds be bought? the economics of counterinsurgency in iraq', *Journal of Political Economy* **119**(4), 766–819.

Blair, R. A., Karim, S. M., Gilligan, M. J. and Beardsley, K. (2016), 'Policing ethnicity: Lab-in-the-field evidence on discrimination, cooperation and ethnic balancing in the liberian national police', *Social Science Research Network* .

Byrne, J. and Monaghan, L. (2008), *Policing Loyalist and Republican Communities: Understanding key issues for local communities and the PSNI*, Institute for Conflict Research Belfast.

Department of the Army (2006), 'Counterinsurgency', *Field Manual 3-24* .

Enloe, C. H. (1980), *Ethnic soldiers: State security in divided societies*, University of Georgia Press.

Fearon, J. D. (1995), Ethnic war as a commitment problem.

Fearon, J. D. (1998), 'Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation', *International organization* **52**(02), 269–305.

Fortna, V. P. (2004), *Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, Princeton University Press.

Haim, D. A., Nanes, M. J. and Davidson, M. W. (2019), 'Family Matters: The Double-Edged Sword of Police Community Connections', *Working Paper* .

Hoddie, M. and Hartzell, C. (2003), 'Civil war settlements and the implementation of military power-sharing arrangements', *Journal of Peace Research* **40**(3), 303–320.

Krebs, R. R. and Licklider, R. (2016), 'United they fall: Why the international community should not promote military integration after civil war', *International Security* **40**(3), 93–138.

Lake, D. A. and Rothchild, D. (1996), 'Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict', *International Security* **21**(2), 41–75.

Lia, B. (2006), *A police force without a state: A history of the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank and Gaza*, Ithaca Press.

Matanock, A. M. (2017), 'Bullets for ballots: Electoral participation provisions and enduring peace after civil conflict', *International Security* **41**(4), 93–132.

Mattes, M. and Savun, B. (2009), 'Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design', *International studies quarterly* **53**(3), 737–759.

Mazerolle, L., Antrobus, E., Bennett, S. and Tyler, T. R. (2013), 'Shaping citizen perceptions of police legitimacy: A randomized field trial of procedural justice', *Criminology* **51**(1), 33–63.

Nanes, M. J. (2019a), Lebanon and gaza, 1975–2017: Israel's extremes of interest alignment, *in* E. Berman and D. A. Lake, eds, 'Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence Through Local Agents', Cornell University Press.

Nanes, M. J. (2019b), 'Police integration and support for anti-government violence in divided societies: Evidence from iraq', *Journal of Peace Research* .

Nanes, M. J. (2019c), 'Policing in divided societies: Officer inclusion, citizen cooperation, and crime prevention', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* .

Parkinson, S. E. (2013), 'Organizing rebellion: Rethinking high-risk mobilization and social networks in war', *American Political Science Review* **107**(3), 418–432.

Posen, B. R. (1993), 'The security dilemma and ethnic conflict', *Survival* **35**(1), 27–47.

Potter, J. (2001), *A Testimony to Courage: The Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment*, Casemate Publishers.

Powell, R. (2006), 'War as a commitment problem', *International organization* **60**(1), 169–203.

Robinson, L. (2009), *Tell me how this ends: General David Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq*, New York: PublicAffairs.

Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S. and Cunningham, D. E. (2011), 'Explaining external support for insurgent groups', *International Organization* **65**(4), 709–744.

Samii, C. (2013), 'Perils or promise of ethnic integration? evidence from a hard case in burundi', *American Political Science Review* **107**(3), 558–573.

San-Akca, B. (2016), *States in disguise: causes of state support for rebel groups*, Oxford University Press.

Saunders, J., Popper, S. W., Morral, A. R., Davis, R. C., Berrebi, C., Leuschner, K. J., Efron, S., Segalovitz, B. and Riley, K. J. (2013), *Effective Policing for 21st-Century Israel*, Rand Corporation.

Sawyer, K., Cunningham, K. G. and Reed, W. (2017), 'The role of external support in civil war termination', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **61**(6), 1174–1202.

Stedman, S. J. (1997), 'Spoiler problems in peace processes', *International security* **22**(2), 5–53.

Strøm, K. W., Gates, S., Graham, B. A. and Strand, H. (2017), 'Inclusion, dispersion, and constraint: Powersharing in the world's states, 1975–2010', *British Journal of Political Science* **47**(1), 165–185.

Tugwell, M. (1981), 'Politics and propaganda of the provisional ira', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **5**(1-2), 13–40.

Walter, B. F. (1997), 'The critical barrier to civil war settlement', *International organization* **51**(03), 335–364.

Walter, B. F. (2002), *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars*, Princeton University Press.

Weitzer, R. and Hasisi, B. (2008), 'Does ethnic composition make a difference? citizens' assessments of arab police officers in israel', *Policing & Society* **18**(4), 362–376.

A Interpolating Officer Data

Figure 3 shows the proportion of Jewish officers in each subdistrict in each year.

Figure 3: Variation in Office Demographics

I used the following procedures to estimate police demographic data across all locations in Israel:

1. Beginning with station-year level data provided by the Israel Police, I identified the location of each named station using Google Maps and publicly-available street addresses. Many entries in the police data were of officers assigned to the same physical location. For example, the Ayalon station in Tel Aviv has separate entries for officers assigned to "Investigations and Intelligence," "Office for Logistical Support," "Office of Administration and Human Resources," and "Technology Unit." I removed officers

assigned to non-patrol units (i.e. Administration and Human Resources or similar offices in which officers would have little interaction with citizens) and then collapsed the remaining officers by location-year.

2. I projected the GPS coordinates of each station and its underlying officer data onto a map using ArcGIS 10.6. I then generated continuous probability surfaces of the number of non-Jewish officers in a location using the software's Ordinary Kriging and Prediction tools.

3. I allowed the probability surfaces to cover the extent of Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Because stations are distributed to achieve full coverage of Israel, this extrapolation was reasonable. However, the 2008 data provided by the police was missing observations from stations in Akko, Golan, Hadera, Haifa, Jezreel, Kineret, and Tzfat subdistricts. I therefore replaced predictions in those subdistricts with missing values.

4. Next, I geolocated all respondents in the 2009, 2013, and 2015 Israel National Election Studies by finding their listed locality in Google Maps and entering the latitude and longitude at the center of that locality. All respondents in a locality are assigned the same coordinates. I projected these locations onto the same map as the police officer demographics.

5. After generating a raster of predicted values from each surface layer, I extracted the raster value of predicted police demographics at the location of each survey respondent using ArcGIS's "Extract Values to Points" tool. I exported the resulting data and merged the location-year police demographics data with individual-level NES survey responses.

B Summary Statistics

Table 6: Summary Statistics (Individual Analysis)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Arab Goals	2.98	1.12	1	4
Return Jerusalem	2.20	1.10	1	4
Evacuate Settlements	1.74	0.66	1	3
Numb. Arab Police	12.87	9.37	2.49	39.29
Prop. Arab Civilians	0.19	0.17	0.05	0.68
Left Wing	3.34	1.66	1	7
Econ. Satisfaction	2.88	0.93	1	5
Male	0.49	0.50	0	1
Religiosity	2.24	0.89	1	4
Education	14.12	3.29	0	39

Table 7: Summary Statistics (Foreign Aid Analysis)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Aid	11,831.10	17,576.24	0	97,713.61
log(Aid)	8.29	2.12	-3.91	11.49
log(Change)	0.21	1.11	-4.60	5.92
Police PS	0.47	0.50	0	1
Freedom House	4.88	1.51	1.5	7
Infant Mortality	80.19	41.74	4.1	175
Resource Rents (ln)	1.37	2.24	-6.00	4.52
Population (ln)	16.19	1.30	13.20	20.64

Table 8: Summary Statistics (External Funding Analysis)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
External Funding	0.18	0.38	0	1
Police PS	0.26	0.16	0	1
Political Wing	0.05	0.22	0	1
Freedom House	4.78	1.67	1	7
Fuel Dependent	0.16	0.36	0	1
Population (ln)	10.02	1.64	6.17	13.88
Rebel Troops (log)	7.82	1.56	2.30	12.18

C   Individual-Level Analysis: Robustness Tests and Additional Results

Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Concessions - Curvilinear Models

D   Power Sharing, Aid, and External Support

Which rebel groups receive police power sharing? I estimate a series of linear probability models to explore the link between several rebel group and country-level factors and a group's likelihood of receiving police power sharing. As in the analysis of external support for rebel groups, the unit of analysis is the conflict dyad year, for all conflict dyads 1975-2011. For consistency with the analysis in this article, I restrict observations to those for which *External Funding* is non-missing. Table 9 shows the results.

Of the potential predictors I test, only the number of rebel troops is significantly associated with police power sharing; groups with more troops are significantly more likely to be included in the police. One possibility is that states allow police power sharing as a concession only when their backs are against the wall in fighting a powerful enemy. However, a dummy variable indicating that rebels have more troops than the state (*Rebel Advantage* from Sawyer et al 2017) is not significantly associated with police power sharing. In other words, a rebel group's absolute size, but not its size relative to the state security forces, predicts police power sharing. I speculate that consistent with my argument, rebel groups which are larger, and therefore can provide a larger number of police officers, are better able to signal information to the general population and external observers through participation. A small group that can make up only 1% of the police force through participation may not be sufficiently visible to make participation a credible signal of anything. On the other hand, a large rebel group whose supporters can make up 10% of the police will be recognizable. Thus, if the government wishes to engage in police power sharing because rebel participation in the police constrains the group's future ability to use unprovoked violence in the future, only larger rebel groups may be visible enough to trigger this mechanism and make police power sharing worthwhile for the government.

Table 9: Likelihood of Police Power Sharing

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel Adv.	0.0504							-0.00746
	(0.0487)							(0.0596)
Rebel Troops (log)		0.0123**						0.0220**
		(0.00530)						(0.00985)
Political Wing			0.0133					0.0332
			(0.0291)					(0.0466)
Freedom House				-0.00300				-0.00873
				(0.00495)				(0.00855)
Fuel Dependent					-0.00623			-0.00392
					(0.0211)			(0.0381)
GDP pc (ln)						-0.00212		-0.00898
						(0.0148)		(0.0260)
Population (ln)							-0.00749	-0.0144
							(0.00522)	(0.0102)
Year	0.00208**	0.00251**	0.00112**	0.00135**	0.00206**	0.00228**	0.00234**	0.00491**
	(0.000844)	(0.00114)	(0.000490)	(0.000582)	(0.000824)	(0.000942)	(0.000920)	(0.00193)
Constant	-4.117**	-5.074**	-2.218**	-2.653**	-4.074**	-4.500**	-4.554**	-9.678**
	(1.675)	(2.280)	(0.971)	(1.146)	(1.634)	(1.849)	(1.808)	(3.746)
Observations	2049	2156	3136	2920	2047	1947	1947	1215

Linear probability models with country clustered SE.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that police and military power sharing increase foreign aid to governments and reduce external funding for rebels. Is this effect specific to security forces power sharing, or might it extend to all forms of power sharing? I test the influence of other types of power sharing using Strøm et al. (2017)'s "Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint" dataset, which codes governing institutions on several dimensions of power sharing for every country-year between 1975 and 2010. I explore the relationship between foreign aid and constitutional or peace agreement mandates for a grand coalition, reserved seats in the executive, reserved seats in parliament, and military integration (Strom et al's coding of military integration differs slightly from the coding in Ansorg et al which I used in the main text).[24] There is no apparent relationship between the mandating of a grand coalition, reserved seats in the executive, or reserved seats in parliament and future aid commitments. On the other hand, both police power sharing and military integration are associated with a significant increase in aid commitments to the signatory government in the following year. I interpret these results as further evidence that foreign donors view security forces power sharing as a major step in the direction of peace and reward governments accordingly. As a byproduct of this reward, security forces power sharing empowers the government to combat future threats, either by bolstering its military capacity or by providing goods and services to citizens which prevent rebels from recruiting domestic support (Berman et al. 2011). Other forms of power sharing do not provide this source of empowerment.

Next, I test how conventional power sharing affects external support for rebels. In Table 11, I reproduce Table 5, Model 1 showing that rebel groups which continue fighting despite inclusion in the police are less likely to receive external funding than those not included in the police. I then substitute constitutional mandates for a grand coalition, minority veto, executive reserved positions, parliamentary reserved seats, and military integration (from Strøm et al. (2017)) in place of police power sharing.[25] Of these, only executive reserved

---

[24]The effective sample size changes depending on the availability of data in the Strom et al dataset.

[25]Table 10 above excludes Minority Veto because there are no instances of minority vetos in the included observations.

Table 10: Foreign Aid Commitments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Police PS	0.369**				
	(0.157)				
Grand Coalition		0.256			
		(0.344)			
Executive Res.			-0.0297		
			(0.170)		
Parliament Res.				-0.354	
				(0.277)	
Military Int.					1.090***
					(0.182)
Prior Yr Aid	66.11	100.2	90.69	87.67	35.14
	(67.65)	(90.83)	(80.97)	(79.86)	(50.06)
Freedom House	-0.0455	-0.0806	-0.0926	-0.0801	-0.158***
	(0.0461)	(0.0720)	(0.0643)	(0.0630)	(0.0568)
Infant Mortality	-0.00132	-0.000132	-0.00109	-0.00157	0.00160
	(0.00361)	(0.00412)	(0.00403)	(0.00385)	(0.00368)
Resource Rents (ln)	-0.0972**	-0.115**	-0.112**	-0.110**	-0.133***
	(0.0477)	(0.0477)	(0.0491)	(0.0502)	(0.0451)
Population (ln)	0.626***	0.570***	0.574***	0.596***	0.659***
	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.0990)
Constant	-7.550***	-6.542***	-6.478***	-6.582***	-7.601***
	(2.088)	(2.171)	(2.015)	(2.019)	(1.531)
Observations	130	107	113	117	117

Negative binomial regression with country clustered SE. Includes year dummies.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

positions are significantly associated with external funding for rebels, and only at $p < .10$. None of the other forms of power sharing appear to bestow a penalty upon rebel groups that receive them and continue to fight in the form of lost external funding. While these models do not conclusively prove that conventional power sharing does *not* impose a penalty on rebels, the absence of a relationship between most forms of power sharing and external funding for rebels is consistent with the argument that police power sharing makes continued rebelling particularly unappealing to former rebels.

Table 11: External Funding for Rebel Groups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Police PS	-1.362**					
	(0.615)					
Grand Coalition		0.824				
		(1.568)				
Minority Veto			0.988			
			(1.557)			
Executive Res.				-1.174		
				(0.744)		
Parliament Res.					-3.999	
					(4.761)	
Military Int.						0.238
						(0.578)
Constant	-3.777*	-3.215	-2.938	-2.904	-3.496	-3.203
	(2.127)	(2.310)	(2.255)	(2.252)	(2.471)	(2.205)
Observations	1215	1093	1105	1105	1048	1115

Logistic regression with country clustered SE. Includes dyad-level and time controls.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$